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LATER RETIREMENT? PATTERNS, PREFERENCES, POLICIES
Pension systems are a major part of the political economy of current societies – much beyond providing old-age 
income security. The well-known demographics of population aging as well as globalization today challenge their 
¿QDQFLDOYLDELOLW\/DWHUUHWLUHPHQWVHHPVWREHDJRRGZD\WRPHHWWKHVHFKDOOHQJHV+RZHYHULWLVQRWRQO\
XQSRSXODUEXWDOVRLQHTXLWDEOHLQWHUPVRIGLIIHUHQWLDOORQJHYLW\7KHSDSHU¿UVWGLVFXVVHVWKHVHSUREOHPVZLWK
DSDUWLFXODUIRFXVRQWKHVRFLDOVWUDWL¿FDWLRQRIPRUWDOLW\,WWKHQDQDO\]HVWKHSUHIHUHQFHVWRZDUGVUHWLUHPHQWDJH
at several levels: in terms of attitudes towards public spending on pensions or towards the state’s responsibility 
in this matter, of support for pension policy alternatives, and of preferred individual age of retirement. Results 
show that large majorities across all age groups are in favour of more government spending on pensions. There 
is a substantial amount of ‘involuntary retirement’, meaning that people would have preferred to work longer 
than they actually did, as well as a somewhat lower amount of ‘involuntary work’, but the preferred ages are 
everywhere below 65, and in some countries still below 60. Finally, the paper examines the policies of raising 
the retirement age adopted during the last two decades. What has especially been lacking in these policies is 
a consideration of socially differentiated longevity.
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PATTERNS
Retirement is today a central part of the social policy agenda of most countries across the 
developed (and increasingly the developing) world1. The high levels of pension expenditures 
experienced in the past few years, and the even higher ones projected for the coming decades, 
have now become a key issue of concern. At stake are the basic options not only for the 
ZHOIDUHVWDWHEXWDOVRIRU¿VFDODQGODERUPDUNHWSROLF\DQGPRUHJHQHUDOO\IRUHFRQRPLF
growth and social cohesion. 
Pension systems thus need to be viewed within a broader framework. Their major purpose 
is to provide income security to retirees. In addition to such redistribution (or individual 
income smoothing) over the life course, they may also aim at redistribution across population 
 * Corresponding author: Martin Kohli, Via dei Roccettini 9, I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy; e-mail: 
martin.kohli@eui.eu.
 1 Here I closely follow a chapter on pension reform in Europe written jointly with Camila Arza (Kohli and Arza 
2011; see also Arza and Kohli 2008).
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groups, lifting low-income elderly out of poverty. But beyond these income goals, they are 
linked up with a range of other issues: 
í WKH\DUHW\SLFDOO\WKHODUJHVWSXEOLFWUDQVIHUSURJUDPVDQGWKXVDVRXUFHRIPDMRU¿VFDO
pressures (and sometimes opportunities),
í WKH\LQÀXHQFH¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWVE\IDYRULQJRULPSHGLQJWKHDFFXPXODWLRQRIIXQGVDQG
of personal savings,
í WKH\UHJXODWHODERUPDUNHWVE\IDFLOLWDWLQJDQRUGHUHGWUDQVLWLRQRXWRIHPSOR\PHQW
í WKH\HQDEOHHPSOR\HUVWRPDQDJHWKHLUZRUNIRUFHE\RIIHULQJLQVWUXPHQWVIRUWKHVKHG-
ding or replacement of workers, 
í WKH\ FRQWULEXWH WR WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQ RI WKH OLIH FRXUVH E\ FUHDWLQJ D SUHGLFWDEOH
sequence and timing between work and retirement,
í WKH\SURYLGHZRUNHUVZLWKDOHJLWLPDWHFODLPWRFRPSHQVDWLRQIRUWKHLUµOLIHORQJ¶ZRUN
and thus have a stake in the moral economy of work societies,
í WKH\DWWDFKFLWL]HQVWRDSXEOLFFRPPXQLW\RIVROLGDULW\DQGWKXVSOD\DSDUWLQQDWLRQ
building,
í WKH\SURGXFHQHZVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOFOHDYDJHVE\FUHDWLQJODUJHJURXSVRIDFWXDODQG
SRWHQWLDOEHQH¿FLDULHV
í WKH\VWUXFWXUHWKHDJHQGDRIFRUSRUDWLVWFRQÀLFWDQGQHJRWLDWLRQ
í WKH\RIIHURSSRUWXQLWLHVIRUDGPLQLVWUDWLYHRI¿FHVDQGMREV
í WKH\KDYHDQLQÀXHQFHRQHOHFWLRQRXWFRPHV
Through all these issues, pension systems form a major part of the political economy of 
current societies. It is no wonder then that they are the focus of intense contention. In political 
discourse, claims about the unsustainability of pension systems abound. These claims are often 
ideological; the sheer size of pension systems make them an inviting target for those whose 
aim is to cut back the welfare state as such. The above list of what public pension systems 
do makes it clear that dismantling them in favor of market-based and individualized solutions 
would have major impacts much beyond old-age income security. 
Still, the challenges to current public pension systems are real. The well-known 
demographics of population aging – rising longevity coupled with low fertility – threaten 
WKHLU ¿QDQFLDO YLDELOLW\ EHFDXVH WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKHZRUNLQJDJH DQG WKH UHWLUHG
population is becoming less favorable. Globalization means that economies have become more 
RSHQQRWRQO\WRWUDGHEXWDOVRWRFDSLWDOÀRZVRSHQHFRQRPLHVFRPSHWHIRUWKHLUSURGXFWLYH
investments and tax base (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). Some scholars speak of an inevitable 
transition from welfare states to investment states and even competition states (Vukov 2014) 
where all social and economic policies are focused on creating a more investor-friendly 
HQYLURQPHQW%HQH¿WVIRUWKHHOGHUO\REYLRXVO\GRQRW¿WVXFKDQDJHQGD
Later retirement seems to be a good way to meet these challenges. Raising the age of exit 
from the work force and entry into the pension system has an impact on both sides: it increases 
the number of workers and decreases the number of pensioners. Figure 1 (from a 2010 Green 
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Paper of the European Commission) provides a graphic illustration of this impact. Assuming 
a mean age of 60 for the transition from work to retirement, the old-age dependency ratio (the 
number of persons in retirement age per person of working age) of 0.4 in 2010 in the EU-27 
is projected to double by 2060 to 0.8. If over these 50 years the mean age for the transition 
is raised by ten years, to 70, the old-age dependency rate remains stable at 0.42. 
Figure 1. EU-27 dependency ratios
Source: European Commission 2010: 25
Later retirement would thus be highly effective. But it is also highly problematic. To begin 
with, it is thoroughly unpopular (see below). It also creates additional poverty risks for those 
who are unable to remain in the labor force until the statutory pension age, be it for reasons 
of health, unemployment, or lack of skills. Moreover it creates a double burden for those 
 2 ,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKLVLVDVLPSOL¿HGSLFWXUHWKDWWDNHVLQWRDFFRXQWRQO\SXUHGHPRJUDSK\7KHTXHVWLRQ
then arises what proportion of the population of “working age” in fact participates in paid work. In this respect 
there is still a considerable “underuse” in terms of unemployment, women remaining outside the labor force, 
and elderly workers exiting before the statutory retirement age. Tapping this potential would mitigate the effect 
of population aging to some extent.

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(mostly women) who do unpaid care work for disabled family members or for grandchildren. 
$QG¿QDOO\LWLVLQHTXLWDEOHLQWHUPVRIGLIIHUHQWLDOORQJHYLW\
7KHODVWSRLQWPHULWVVRPHHODERUDWLRQ(YLGHQFHRQWKHVRFLDOVWUDWL¿FDWLRQRIPRUWDOLW\
has been slow to come but is now available for an increasing number of countries. For the 
U.S., a study for the year 2010 shows that among white men with less than 12 years of 
education (Olshansky et al. 2012) remaining life expectancy at age 65 is 14.8 years, while 
among those with more than 16 years of education it is 19.7 years – fully one-third higher. For 
white women the respective numbers are 17.7 and 21.7 years. A study of German men based 
on the records of the pension system for the year 2003 provides similar results (Shkolnikov 
et al. 2008). What is more, this longevity gap seems to be growing. For the top half of U.S. 
earners, life expectancy at current normal age of retirement (67) is projected to increase by 
11 years from the 1912 to the 1973 birth cohort (if the current trend persists), but for the 
bottom half it will remain unchanged (Baker and Rosnick 2010). 
$WHTXDOUHWLUHPHQWDJHVSHRSOHLQWKHORZHUSDUWRIWKHVWUDWL¿FDWLRQKLHUDUFK\WKXVHQMR\
WKHLUSHQVLRQEHQH¿WVIRUDFRQVLGHUDEO\VKRUWHUSHULRGWKDQWKRVHLQWKHXSSHUSDUW,QRWKHU
words, a pension system with undifferentiated age of access is regressive: it redistributes 
EHQH¿WVIURPWKHERWWRPWRWKHWRS7KLVDOVRPHDQVWKDWUDLVLQJWKHUHWLUHPHQWDJHZRXOG
indiscriminately punish those at the bottom more than those at the top because it makes 
WKHP ORVHD UHODWLYHO\ ODUJHUSDUWRI WKHLU H[SHFWHGEHQH¿WVRU³SHQVLRQZHDOWK´ 5RVQLFN
and Baker 2012). 
PREFERENCES
3UHIHUHQFHVWRZDUGVWKHSHQVLRQV\VWHP±DQGPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\WRZDUGVUHWLUHPHQWDJH±
may be examined at several levels: in terms of attitudes towards public spending on pensions 
or towards the state’s responsibility in this matter, of support for pension policy alternatives, 
DQG¿QDOO\RISUHIHUUHGLQGLYLGXDODJHRIUHWLUHPHQW$VIRUDWWLWXGHVLWKDVORQJEHHQVKRZQ
that there is broad support for public spending on old-age pensions, not only among retirees or 
those close to retirement but also among younger age groups. A good comparative assessment 
RIDJHVSHFL¿FDWWLWXGHVLVRIIHUHGE\WKH,QWHUQDWLRQDO6RFLDO6XUYH\3URJUDP,663ZLWK
its special module on Role of Government of 1996 (analyzed by Busemeyer et al. 2009, 
with 13 West European and North American countries) and 2006 (own calculations, with 
16 countries). A standard question is whether one would like to see (much) more or (much) 
less or unchanged government spending on welfare domains such as pensions or education. 
Respondents are reminded that if they opt for “much more” spending this might require a tax 
increase to pay for it. Results are fourfold (see Fig. 2): 
1) large majorities are in favor of more or much more government spending – as opposed 
to less or much less – on pensions (as well as on education, not shown here). The net 
support – those opting for more or much more minus those opting for less or much less 
spending – is largely positive for both groups across both policy domains in all countries.
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2) contrasting retired people over 60 with all non-retired people, there is some difference 
between the two domains. For pensions, the retired show somewhat more net support than 
the non-retired, while for education there is a modest gradient in the opposite direction. 
There is thus a modest age (or cohort) effect in attitudes, but both pensions and education 
remain popular among both groups.
3) as for country differences, in no country do those opting for (much) less spending make 
up more than 10% for pensions and more than 11% for education. The largest support 
for spending (much) more on pensions – with more than 70% in both age groups – is 
found in the UK and Ireland where the public pension level is especially low.
4) between 1996 (not shown here) and 2006, attitudes on spending on education remained 
essentially the same in the aggregate (with some changes in the rank-order of countries), 
while on pensions there was even a rise in support for (much) more spending. Lest we 
should think that popular opinion is always in favor of spending more on welfare programs 
HYHQZLWK WKHDGGLWLRQDOTXDOL¿FDWLRQ LQWURGXFHGE\ WKH UHPLQGHU WKDW LWPD\UHTXLUH
higher taxes), there is a counterexample: support for spending on unemployment is much 
lower, and many countries show a net negative attitude (see Fig. 3). 
Figure 2. Attitudes to spending on pensions (ISSP 2006)
Own calculations based on International Social Survey Program 2006
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Figure 3. Attitudes to spending on unemployment (ISSP 2006)
Source: own calculations based on International Social Survey Program 2006
These results are corroborated by evidence on attitudes towards the state’s responsibility 
for various policy domains (Kohl 2013, based on the “European Social Survey” 4/2008). 
On a scale between 0 (“not at all responsible”) and 10 (“fully responsible”), the state’s 
responsibility for an adequate standard of living in old age is seen at 8.3, second only to 
adequate health provision (8.5), while for an adequate standard of living for the unemployed 
it is again considerably lower (6.7). The unbroken popularity of pensions – even in the face 
of a broad public discourse about the inevitability of “reforms” in the sense of cutbacks – may 
UHÀHFWDSHUFHSWLRQ WKDWFRQWUDU\ WRXQHPSOR\PHQW LQVXUDQFH WKH\GRQRWSUHVHQWDPRUDO
hazard. Moreover, pensions and the life in retirement that they make possible are generally 
FRQVLGHUHGDZHOOGHVHUYHGULJKW7KHHOGHUO\DUHWKXVVHHQDV³ZRUWK\´EHQH¿WUHFLSLHQWV
while for the unemployed this is less the case.
7KH VHFRQG OHYHO FRQFHUQV VSHFL¿F SROLF\ RSWLRQV IRU FKDQJLQJ RU PDLQWDLQLQJ WKH
public pension system. A good point of departure is provided by a Eurobarometer study of 
2001 (Kohl 2003) – still the only broad comparative data on popular support for alternative 
SDWKZD\VWR¿VFDOFRQVROLGDWLRQ)LJ2IWKHWKUHHPDLQDOWHUQDWLYHVH[DPLQHGKHUHWKH
¿UVWRQH³&XUUHQWSHQVLRQOHYHOVVKRXOGEHPDLQWDLQHGHYHQLIWKLVPHDQVUDLVLQJWD[HVRU
contributions”) gained majority support in all EU member countries. 30% of EU citizens 
strongly agreed and 38% slightly agreed with this statement; only 5% disagreed strongly 
and an additional 15% disagreed slightly. This is again clear evidence for the popularity of 
spending on pensions. In contrast, the second alternative (“contribution rates should not be 
raised even if this means lower pension levels”) was supported by only 31% (strongly and 

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slightly together) and disapproved of by a majority of the respondents (53% altogether). 
The third alternative (“the age of retirement should be raised so that people work longer and 
therefore spend less time in retirement”) was by far the least popular: it was favoured by only 
23%, while 69% disagreed with it3. This rank-order of the three main alternatives was the 
same in almost all countries. The differences between young and elderly or between retired 
and non-retired people were small, “much less pronounced than one would expect from the 
viewpoint of ‘rational’, self-interested actors” (Kohl 2003: 7).
Figure 4. Support for pension policy alternatives (Eurobarometer 2001)
Source: adapted from Kohl (2003)
The third level is preferences in terms of one’s own retirement age. In a recent study, 
based on data from the “European Social Survey” 11/2010, we have analyzed the match or gap 
between actual and preferred retirement ages for those who retired between 1995 and 2001 
(Steiber and Kohli 2014). We examined both “involuntary retirement” (having retired earlier 
than one would have preferred) and “involuntary work” (having worked longer than one would 
have preferred). Involuntary retirement results from constraints to employment that may derive 
from a lack of demand for the workers’ labor (for example, unemployment or other employment 
 3 As Kohl (2003: 6) notes: “These patterns of opinion and policy preferences are in stark contrast to the image 
created by media coverage which suggests that there is strong tax resistance on the part of the citizens, and 
WKDW WKH\DUHUDWKHUZLOOLQJWRDFFHSWEHQH¿WFXWV WKDQKLJKHUWD[RUFRQWULEXWLRQUDWHV:KLOHWKLVPD\EH
WUXHSHUKDSVZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHJHQHUDOWD[EXUGHQLWLVREYLRXVO\QRWWUXHZLWKUHJDUGWRWKHVSHFL¿FLVVXHRI
SXEOLFSHQVLRQV7KLV¿QGLQJFDQEHWDNHQDVHYLGHQFHWKDWFLWL]HQVDUHLQIDFWZLOOLQJWRDFFHSWDKLJKHUWD[
EXUGHQ±SURYLGHGWKH\JHWDVSHFL¿FVRFLDOEHQH¿WLQUHWXUQ,WDOVRGHPRQVWUDWHVWKHKLJKGHJUHHRIDFFHSWDQFH
attributed to the public provision of pensions”.

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constraints for older workers, legal provisions of mandatory retirement), from alternative 
commitments that do not allow for continued work (for example, care responsibilities), or 
from health limitations (for example, chronic illness or disability). Involuntary work pertains 
WRFRQWLQXHGZRUNXQWLODKLJKHUDJHWKDQSUHIHUUHGGXHWRIRUH[DPSOH¿QDQFLDOQHFHVVLW\
KLJKHUDJHWKUHVKROGVIRUHOLJLELOLW\WRSHQVLRQEHQH¿WVRUWKHFORVXUHRIHDUO\H[LWRSWLRQV
Table 1 gives a descriptive overview of the actual and preferred ages of retirement and of 
their degree of overlap across the 12 countries in the sample. It shows that:
– there are sizeable differences in the mean actual retirement ages among countries,
– that in the mean, retirees would have preferred to work somewhat longer (except Greek 
men and women and Czech women),
– that there is therefore a substantial amount of involuntary retirement but also
– a (somewhat lower) amount of involuntary work, with Greece and the Czech Republic 
again having the highest share. 
It might therefore seem that the massive disapproval of a later retirement age observed in 
2001 has somewhat subsided since then. It should be noted, however, that the preferred ages 
are everywhere below 65, and in some countries still below 60. As long as these preferences 
remain stable, an increase in the statutory retirement age beyond 65 will eliminate involuntary 
retirement but at the price of greatly increasing involuntary work. Such an increase is thus 
OLNHO\WRPHHWZLWKRSSRVLWLRQ7KHUHLVPRUHRYHUHYLGHQFHWKDWERWKW\SHVRIXQIXO¿OOHG
preferences have negative consequences in terms of individual well-being.
POLICIES
The most important consequences to be drawn from this discussion of patterns and 
preferences are threefold: 
1) raising the age of eligibility for public pensions is a good way to contain their costs in 
response to demographic aging and economic globalization, 
2) such raises (still) go against population attitudes and individual preferences, and are thus 
likely to impact negatively on well-being, 
 JLYHQWKHVRFLDOVWUDWL¿FDWLRQRIPRUWDOLW\VXFKUDLVHVDUHLQHTXLWDEOH
How have policies taken account of these points, and what should be done?
The successful expansion of welfare states since the 1950s has created conditions that 
militate for its own continuity (Kohli and Arza 2011: 259). Existing institutions are resistant 
WRFKDQJHERWKLQWHUPVRIJHQHUDOLQHUWLDDQGRIWKHVSHFL¿FZHOIDUHUHJLPHVWKDWWKH\DUH
embedded in (path dependency). In the literature of the 1990s, European pension systems were 
widely thought of as “immovable objects” (Pierson 1998), as part of the “frozen landscapes” 
of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1996). This way of thinking had good reasons going 
for it. Welfare states had produced their own constituencies; they had turned the citizenry 
or large parts of it into their stakeholders who would oppose dismantling or changing them. 
These interest-group networks produced lock-in effects that reinforced the status quo.
2
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7DEOHActual and preferred ages of retirement (ESS 2010/11)
$$5
(mean)
3$5
(mean)
Gap
(mean)
Degree of overlap
NInvoluntary work
[%]
Voluntary 
retirement [%]
Involuntary 
retirement [%]
Total 
[%]
Male retirees
Sweden 63.5 64.1 0.7 13.9 59 27.1 100 122
Spain 61.9 63.7 1.8 13.1 48.7 38.3 100 130
Denmark 61.8 63.6 1.8 3.1 67.2 29.8 100 131
Netherlands 61.4 62.1 0.7 15.9 51.9 32.2 100 155
Germany 60.8 62.8 2 11.1 42 46.9 100 266
Great Britain 60.7 62 1.3 18.9 46.9 34.2 100 184
Greece 60.6 59.9 í 36.4 43.3 20.4 100 230
Finland 60.4 62.2 1.8 10.9 57 32 100 128
Czech 59.6 60.1 0.5 24.9 44.4 30.7 100 160
France 59.2 59.9 0.7 15.7 51.8 32.5 100 159
Slovakia 58.8 60 1.2 20.6 51.9 27.5 100 125
Hungary 58.3 60 1.6 13.5 47.4 39.1 100 102
Female retirees
Sweden 63 64.1 1.0 11.3 59.7 29 100 124
Denmark 61 62.9 1.9 4.5 59.7 35.8 100 134
Germany 60.8 61.8 1.0 13.5 52.9 33.6 100 201
Greece 60.5 59.4 í 44.1 34 21.9 100 133
Finland 59.9 61.1 1.2 9.5 61 29.5 100 105
Great Britain 59.8 60.9 1.1 14.4 54.9 30.7 100 191
France 59.2 59.8 0.6 20.4 47.4 32.2 100 157
Czech 57.9 57.5 –0.3 34.3 46.4 19.3 100 195
Hungary 55.9 57.2 1.3 18.7 39.9 41.5 100 106
Slovakia 55.8 56.4 0.6 19.6 46.8 33.7 100 211
Source: European Social Survey (ESS) Round 5
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7KHUHDOLW\RIWKHSDVWWZRGHFDGHVKDVODUJHO\IDOVL¿HGWKLVWKLQNLQJKRZHYHU3HQVLRQ
reforms involving cutbacks have broadly occurred (see Kohli and Arza 2011: 255; Hinrichs 
2015). Among the various policy measures, raising the statutory retirement age has been 
especially widespread, taken in almost all countries. But governments have developed 
strategies that minimize the political costs of passing such unpopular reforms. For raising 
the retirement age, the most prominent such strategy has been to use long phasing-in periods 
for reforms to be implemented. This can have a divisive effect on potential opponents as 
not everyone is affected in the same way. In Western Europe the phasing-in periods set by 
recent reforms have been particularly long. The full implementation of the French reform 
of 2003, for instance, will only take place in 2020; the 1999 reform in Germany will be 
fully implemented around 2025, and the 2006 reform, in 2029; the Italian structural reform 
legislated in 1995 will be fully effective in 2035; and the rise in retirement ages in the UK 
legislated in 2007 will be implemented between 2024 and 2046. Long phasing-in periods are 
also necessary to give individuals and families the time to adapt their life plans and choices 
to the new institutional context. They are, however, not without costs. They obviously delay 
the onset of the budgetary easing that they are aimed at. Moreover, they may raise doubts 
among the population regarding the likelihood that reforms will be effectively implemented 
LQWKHIXWXUHVRWKDWDGDSWDWLRQLVVWLÀHG7KH\DOVRSDVVWKHSROLWLFDOFRVWVRIUHDOO\DSSO\LQJ
controversial legislation on to the following governments, who may be tempted to renege 
RQ WKHP$QG¿QDOO\ WKH\PD\ ODJEHKLQG WKHHYROXWLRQRI WKH VWUXFWXUDOFKDOOHQJHV WKH\
are supposed to respond to, for example, if life expectancy increases more quickly than the 
phased-in increase in retirement age.
Reforms are also more likely to be accepted if they are seen as “inevitable”. For this to 
happen, governments need to create a convincing discourse, selling cutbacks as necessary 
“reforms”. Accounting for the power of discourse and ideas, and of the “epistemic communities” 
of experts which coin and carry them, has recently made a comeback in policy analysis. As 
Vivian A. Schmidt has observed, “no major and initially unpopular welfare-state reform could 
VXFFHHGLQWKHPHGLXPWHUPLILWGLGQRWDOVRVXFFHHGLQFKDQJLQJWKHXQGHUO\LQJGH¿QLWLRQ
RIPRUDO DSSURSULDWHQHVV´ 6FKPLGW   DQG FKDQJLQJ WKLV GH¿QLWLRQ UHTXLUHV WKH
implementation of convincing ideas. 
This applies not least to the rhetoric of “reform” itself. Existing institutions can lose their 
legitimacy if they are successfully framed as obsolete and in need of reform or “modernization”. 
A number of governments have been persuaded over the last decade to abolish Pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) pension schemes because they allegedly would be more vulnerable to demographic 
changes than funded schemes. This idea has been sponsored by many powerful actors and has 
gained wide currency even though, as Barr (2002), among others, has shown, it is economically 
mistaken. Both funding and PAYG are ways of organizing claims on future output, so they are 
both adversely affected by a fall in output. Among the ten “myths” that Barr aims to dispel, 
the myth that “funding resolves adverse demographics” is his Number One. On the other 
hand, funded systems do make an important difference, not only because they are a bonanza 
IRUWKH¿QDQFLDOLQGXVWU\EXWDOVREHFDXVHWKH\FKDQJHWKHVWDNHV±DQGWKHUHE\WKHSROLWLFDO
interest base – for the pensioners themselves: while in PAYG schemes they have an interest 
LQZRUNLQFRPHVEHFDXVHSHQVLRQEHQH¿WVXVXDOO\GHSHQGRQFRQWULEXWLRQVIURPZRUNHUV
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DQGEHFDXVHEHQH¿WUDWHVDUHRIWHQLQGH[HGWRZRUNLQFRPHVLQIXQGHGV\VWHPVWKH\EHFRPH
VPDOOFDSLWDOLVWVZKRKDYHDQLQWHUHVWLQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRI¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWV
7KHSRZHURI LGHDVPD\KHOS WR H[SODLQ WKHJURZLQJSRSXODULW\ RI1RWLRQDO'H¿QHG
Contribution (NDC) schemes. In a process of retrenchment which necessarily entails 
a distribution of losses, an effective political strategy is to make these losses derive from 
widely-shared principles of fairness, such as “to each what each has contributed” or “all 
should have to share the costs equally”. Thus, NDC or similar schemes – which are linked 
both to individual contributions over the life course and to demographic relations between 
cohorts – may be more legitimate and easier to package in a discursive framework appealing 
to shared values and norms than other parametric reforms such as direct cuts on replacement 
rates or retirement age increases. 
Ideas of fairness may also come into play in attempts to raise the retirement age. Early 
exit from the labor force, long encouraged by consensual strategies of employers and unions 
with the explicit or implicit collusion of the state (Kohli et al. 1991), has lost its allure. The 
idea that people should work up to the statutory retirement age (usually 65) provided that 
health, family and labor market conditions allow them to do so seems to become increasingly 
acceptable. While raising the retirement age limit beyond the threshold of 65 remains highly 
contentious and has sometimes provoked massive public protests, raising the labor force 
participation below this threshold is now a broadly consensual goal, as stated, for example, in 
the Lisbon (1999) and Stockholm (2000) agendas of the European Union. The goal set in 2000 
for the year 2010, to be achieved by all member states, was an employment rate of at least 
50% among the population aged 55–64. To some observers this seemed an overly ambitious 
goal at the time, given that several countries showed a rate of less than 30% (while Denmark 
was slightly, and Sweden already largely, above 50% – putting Sweden in line with countries 
such as the United States, Japan, and Switzerland). But by 2010 another six out of the 15 EU 
member states of 1997 had reached the goal, some among them (such as the Netherlands, 
Finland and Germany) with very substantial increases that amounted to a policy reversal.
On the other hand, half of the population aged 55–64 in employment seems like a modest 
goal, with a long way still to go towards activation. The critical issue that has generated 
FRQÀLFWKHUHLVWRZKDWH[WHQWHPSOR\PHQWDWWKLVDJHLVDIUHHGHFLVLRQE\WKHZRUNHUDQG
to what extent it is constrained by, for instance, labor market conditions or health reasons. 
7RWKHH[WHQWWKDWHOGHUO\ZRUNHUVKDYHEHFRPHXQ¿WIRUZRUNRUXQDEOHWR¿QGHPSOR\PHQW
a rising retirement age in pension schemes backed up by actuarially fair deductions for earlier 
exit will entail for them a drop in pension income beyond their own choice.
What has been lacking in these policies for raising the retirement age is a reference to 
WKHWKLUGSRLQWRXWOLQHGDERYHWKHVRFLDOVWUDWL¿FDWLRQRIPRUWDOLW\7KHSHUFHSWLRQWKDWVXFK
raises are unfair in this respect may be a key factor in the public opposition to them. As Paul 
Krugman (2013) has noted, one argument for cutting Social Security in the U.S. is “that we 
should raise the retirement age [...] because people are living longer. This sounds plausible 
until you look at exactly ZKR is living longer.” He goes on to ask whether we should not 
let janitors retire because lawyers are living longer. The new pension rules introduced by 
the German “grand coalition” of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in early 2014, 
allowing workers with at least 45 contribution years to retire at 63 with a full pension, could 
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be seen as an attempt to create a social differentiation of retirement ages along these lines, 
EXWWKH\KDYHEHHQVKRZQWREHQH¿WQRWWKRVHPRVWLQQHHGEXWUDWKHUWKHPDOHZRUNHUHOLWH
– a case of good intentions with problematic outcomes.
What should the policy agenda be in order to account for the issues discussed so far? 
Increasing the labor force participation of all groups at all ages up to the statutory retirement 
is now a broadly accepted proposition, while raising the retirement age beyond that threshold 
remains contentious and problematic. For both measures, however, a set of conditions needs 
to be met to make them effective and equitable, both in terms of individual preconditions 
and of policies to improve them. First on the list is elderly workers’ health and labor market 
access. In policy terms this requires health prevention, some measure of job security, and 
LQYHVWPHQWLQOLIHORQJHGXFDWLRQDQGTXDOL¿FDWLRQ3HQVLRQUXOHVDOVRQHHGWRSURYLGHVHFXULW\
for those who for reasons of poor health or labor market position are nevertheless unable to 
work until the statutory retirement age, as well as for those who have been unable to assemble 
DVXI¿FLHQWFRQWULEXWLRQUHFRUGGXHWRSUHFDULRXVDQGRULQWHUUXSWHGZRUNFDUHHUV1H[WFRPHV
accounting for competing obligations and activities, especially care work, along the lines of 
ZRUNIDPLO\UHFRQFLOLDWLRQSROLFLHVLQHDUOLHUSKDVHVRIWKHOLIHFRXUVH$QG¿QDOO\SHQVLRQ
rules should account for the inequality of remaining life expectancy.
This is a tall agenda, and several of these issues are only now being perceived and tackled 
by appropriate policies. What is already clear at this stage is that the agenda requires measures 
WKDWDUH¿QHO\WXQHGWRWKHH[LVWLQJVRFLDOSROLF\IUDPHZRUNVRWKDWWKHUHFDQEHQRRQHVL]H
¿WVDOOVROXWLRQ,WLVDOVRFOHDUWKDWWKHVHPHDVXUHVQHHGWREHFORVHO\HYDOXDWHG7KHVRFLDO
sciences will be challenged into a better and more continuous assessment of policy outcomes. 
Sample: retirees who retired at ages 50–69 in the years 1995–2011. Shown are the weighted 
means of actual ages of retirement (AAR), preferred ages of retirement (PAR) and of the gap 
between the two (PAR-AAR) as well as the weighted shares of respondents who retired later 
WKDQWKH\SUHIHUUHGLQYROXQWDU\ZRUNZKRUHWLUHGDWWKHSUHIHUUHGDJHíRQH\HDUDQG
who retired earlier than they preferred (involuntary retirement), from: Steiber and Kohli 2014.
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